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'\vhich go beyond the ordinary motives of commerce and
partake of a political character, from a desire either to
embarrass the one belligerent or to support the other.
In the present case the agree1nent of the parties as to the
amount to be a1lo\ved for freight disposes of all question as to the claimants' rights to compensation for mere
inconvenience caused by enforcing the order in council.
Presumably that stun took into account the actual course
and duration of the voyage and constituted a proper
recompense alike for carrying and for discharging the
cargo under the actual circumstances of that service.
The further claims are in the nature of claims for damages for unla,vful interference with the performance of the
Rotterdam charter party. They can be maintained only
by supposing that a '\Vrong was done to the claimants,
because they were prevented from performing it, for in
their nature these claims assume that the shipowners
are to be put in the same position as if they had completed the voyage under that contract, and are not merely
to be remunerated on proper terms for the performance
of the voyage, which was in fact accomplished. In other
words, they are a claim for damages, as for wrong done
by the mere fact of putting in force the order in council.
Such a claim can not be sustained. Their lordships will
humbly advise IIis ~{ajesty that the appeal should be
dismissed ,~vi th costs.
THE

"I.~EONORA."

[PRIVY CouNCIL.]

ON APPEAL FR.Ol\1 TI-IE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND.
July 31, 1919.
[1919] A. C. 974.

Appeals from decrees of the admiralty division (in
prize) dated April 18, 1918. 77
The appellants in the two appeals \Vere respectively
the O'\vners of the Dutch stee:unship Leonora and the
o'\vners of a cargo of coal 'vhich she 'vas carrying when
captured. The ship and cargo 'vere seized and condemned under an order in council of February 16, 1917,
kno,vn as the second retaliatory order. The facts
appear from the judgment of their lordships. The order
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in council is fully set out in the report of the hearing
before the president.
July 31. The judgment of their lordships 'vas delivered th~t~!~~ent or
by Lord Sumner. The Leonora, a Dutch steamship bound
from Rotterdam to Stockhohn direct, was stopped on
August 16, 1917, by His IV[ajesty's tropedo boat F7'1',
outside territorial "raters, and shortly after passing
Ymuiden. She was taken into Har,vich. Her cargo,
'vhich was neutral owned, consisted of coal, the produce
of collieries in Belgium. It was not intended that she
should call at any British or allied port, nor had any
application been made on her behalf for the appointment
of a British port for the examination of her cargo. Both
ship and cargo "rere condemned, pursuant to the order
in council, elated February 16, 1917, and both the shipowners and the cargo owners appeal.
1'heir lordships are satisfied that the cargo was "of
enemy origin" 'vi thin the meaning of paragraphs 2 and 3 Enemy origin.
of that order. The term had been used in the order of
March 11, 1915, paragraph 4, and, o'ving to doubts as to
the effect of the word "enemy" therein, a further order
was made on January 10, 1917, which applied the tern1 cll,
.ordersincounMar. 11, 1915,
"enemy origin," as used in that paragraph, to goods Feb.16, 1917.
"originating in any enemy country." In the present
case, the question is one of the interpretation of the third
order, that of February 16, 1917, "rhich, beyond saying
that it is supplemental to the above-mentioned orders,
makes no further express reference to them, but from the
recital as to the recent proceedings of the German Government, it is plain that the order of 1917 dealt with a wider
mischief and "ras intended to have a wider scope than the
previous order. It is therefore necessary to have regard
to the system of exploitation then in force in Belgium for
the advancement of German interests, in order to appreciate the full effect of the words "enemy origin." It
is not necessary to inquire 'vhether, 'vithin the terms of
the order, a Belgian origin could, as such, be regarded as
an "enemy" origin for this purpose, or 'vhat the effect,
if any, of the Ger1nan occupation might be on the vie'v
to be taken of the nationality of persons resident in
Belgium. The collieries from 'vhich this coal came were
included in the German "I(ohlenzentrale," a system by
which the coal production of Belgium 'vas strictly controlled and 'vas compulsorily Inanipulated, 'vith the
object of supporting German exchange and assisting
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especially Holland and Sweden. In particular, the
export of Belgian coal to Sweden was encouraged, because it assisted to procure a reciprocal i~portation of
ore from Sweden. The actual sale of this very cargo
was arranged in Cologne by an official of the Kohlenzentrale in his o'vn name, nor is it proved that he ,Nas, in
fact, selling on behalf of some undisclosed principal,
either in Belgium or elsewhere. Payment for it was n1ade
by lodging Swedish kroner in a Stockholm bank to the
credit of the Kohlenzentrale. It is stated in the German
regulations that "the amount realized by the sale 'vill
be paid to the vendors," whoever they may have been.
Perhaps this may have been so; for if no money at all
reached the colliery, presumably the getting of coal there
"\Vould come to an end; but whatever crumbs may have
been allowed to fall from the masters' table, the fact is
clear that these coals were won, sold, and shipped as
part of a German Government trade, carried on for the
benefit of the enemy in prosecuting the 'var. To deny
to them the term "of enemy origin," as used in this order,
'vould be pedantic. The order is devised to give effect
to a scheme of retaliation, which 'vill compel the enemy
to desist from outrageous conduct, by crippling or
preventing trade in goods which in a broad, but very
real, sense he made his own. It does not employ this
expression ''of enemy origin'' as a mere geographical
term, nor as merely descriptive of the nationality of the
original owners of the coal, who were involuntary, and
probably reluctant, victims of the German system.
Upon this point the view of their lordships is that the
learned president's conclusion was right.
'l'he appellants' main case was that the order in council
was invalid, principally on the ground that it pressed so
hardly on neutral merchants and interfered so much 'vith
their rights that, as against the1n, it could not be held to
fall within such right of reprisal as a belligerent enjoys
under the law of nations. A subordinate part of their
argument was that in its application to the Leonora the
order was bad, because no British port had been appointed at 'vhich she would call for the exa1nination of
her cargo. In so far as this circumstance forms part of
to the general hardship to neutrals it ,vin be dealt 'vith
presently. As a separate point their lordships think that
it fails, for the language of the order in council does not
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constitute the appointment of some British port for ex- na~~~~. of
arnination of the cargoes, either of this ship or of ships
in general, a condition precedent to the application of
the order. The proviso relieving vessels which call at
an appointed port operates not as a prescription of the
circumstances under which alone such application is admissible, but merely as a mode of mitigating the stringency of the order. The evidence discloses no reason
why the appointment of a convenient port should not
have been applied for to facilitate the Leonora's voyage,
and a difficulty can not be relied on as a circumstance of
excessive inconvenience to neutrals, which it was in their
power to remove by such simple means.
Upon the validity of the order in council itself th~ appellants advanced a twofold argument. The major proposition was that the order purported to create an offense,
namely, failure to call at a British or allied port, which
is unknown to the law of nations, and to impose punishment upon neutrals for committing it; in both respects it
was said that the order is incompetent. The minor
proposition was that the belligerent's right to take measures of retaliation, such as it is, must be limited, as
against neutrals, by the condition that the exercise of
that right must not inflict on neutrals an undue or disproportionate degree of inconvenience. In the present
case various circumstances of inconvenience were relied
on, notably the perils of crossing the North Sea to a
British port of call and the fact that no particular port
of call in Great Brit.ain had been appointed for the vessel
to proceed to.
In the Stigstad 78 their lordships had occasion to consider and to decide some at least of the principles upon
which the exercise of the right of retaliation rests, and
by those principles they are bound. In the present case,
nevertheless, they have had the advantage of counsel's
full reexamination of the whole subject, and full citation
of the authorities, and of a judgment by the president in
the prize court, which is itself a monument of research.
The case furthermore has been presented under circumstances as favorable to neutrals as possible, for the difference in the stringency of the two orders in council,
that of 1915 and that of 1917, is marked, since in the
7t~
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case of the later order the consequences of disregarding
it have been increased in gravity and the burden imposed
on neutrals has become more weighty. If policy or sympathy can be invoked in any case they could be and
were invoked here.
']:'heir lordships, ho,vever, after a careful review of their
opinion in the Stigstad, think that they have neither
ground to modify, still less to doubt, that opinion, even
if it were open to them to do so, nor is there any occasion in the present case to embark on a general restatement of the doctrine or a minute reexamination of
the authorities.
ri~~s~ligeren t
There are certain rights, which a belligerent enjoys by
the law of nations in virtue of belligerency, which may be
enforced even against neutral subjects and to the prejudice of their perfect freedom of action, and this because
"\Vithout those rights maritime war would be frustrated
and the appeal to the arbitrament of arms be made of
none effect. Such for example are the rights of visit and
search, the right of blockade and the right of preventing
traffic in contraband of war. In some cases a part of
the mode in which the right is exercised consists of some
solemn act of proclamation on the part of the belligerent,
by which notice is given to all the world of the enforcement of these rights and of the limits set to their exercise.
Such is the proclamation of a blockade and the notification of a list of contraband. In these cases the belligerent
sovereign does not create a new offense motu proprio; he
does not, so to speak, legislate or create a new rule of
law; he elects to exercise his legal rights and puts them
into execution in accordance with the prescriptions of the
existing law. Nor again in such cases does the retaliating
Offitce of a prize belligerent invest a court of prize with a new jurisdiction
cour.
or make the court his mandatory to punish a new offense.
The office of a court of prize is to provide a formal and
regular sanction for the law of nations applicable to maritime warfare, both between belligerent and belligerent
and between belligerent and neutral. Whether the la"\v
in question is brought into operation by the act of both
belligerents in resorting to 'var, as is the case with the
rules of internationalla"\v as to hostilities in general, or by
the assertion of a particular right arising out of a particular provocation in the course of the "\Var on the part of
one of them, it is equally the duty of a court of prize, by
virtue of its general jurisdiction as such, to provide for
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the regular enforcement of that right, when la,vfully
asserted before it, and not to leave that enforcement to
the mere jurisdiction of the sword. Disregard of a valid
measure of retaliation is as against neutrals just as justiciable in a court of prize as is breach of blockade or the
carriage of contraband of war. The jurisdiction of a
court of prize is at least as essential in the neutral's
interest as in the interest of the belligerent, and if the
court is to have power to release in the interest of the one,
it must also have inherent power to condemn in justice
to the other. Capture and condemnation are the prescriptive and established modes by which the law of nations
as applicable to maritime warfare is enforced. Statutes
and international conventions may invest the court with
other powers or prescribe other modes of enforcing the
la,v, and the belligerent sovereign may in the appropriate
form waive part of his rights and disclaim condemnation
in favor of some milder sanction, such as detention. In
the terms of the present order, which says that a vessel ca~:~~!u!~d co~~
(par.2) shall be "liable to capture and condemnation" demnation.
and that goods (par.3 ) shall be "liable to condemnation,"
some a.rgument has been found for the appellants' main
proposition, that the order in council creates an offense
and attaches this penalty, but their lordships do not
accept this view. The order declares, by way of warning
and for the sake of completeness, the consequences which
may follow from disregard of it; but, if the occasion has
given rise to the right to retaliate, if the belligerent has
validly availed himself of the occasion, and if the vessel
has been encountered at sea under the circumstances
mentioned, the right and duty to bring the ship and cargo
before a court of prize, as for a justiciable offense against
the right of the belligerent, has arisen thereupon, and the
jurisdiction to condemn is that which is inherent in the
court. That a rebuttable presumption is to be deemed
to arise under paragraph 1, and that a saving proviso is
added to paragraph 2, are modifications introduced by
way of waiver of the sovereign's rights. Had they been
omitted the true question would still have been the same,
though arising in a more acute form, namely, does this
exercise of the right of retaliation upon the enemy
occasion inconvenience or injustice to a neutral, so extreme as to invalidate it as against him~ In principle it
is not the belligerent who creates an offense and imposes
a penalty by his own "\vill and then by his own authority
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empowers and directs the court of prize to enforce it. It
is the law of nations, in its application to maritime warfare, which at the same time recognizes the right, of
which the belligerent can avail himself sub modo, and
makes violation of that right, when so availed of, an
offense, and is the foundation and authority for the right
and duty of the court of prize to condemn, if it finds the
capture justified, unless that right has been reduced by
statute or otherwise, or that duty has been limited by
the waiver of his rights on the part of the sovereign of
the captors.
It is equally inadmissible to describe such an order in
council as this as an executive measure of police on the
part of the Cro\vn for the purpose of preventing an inconvenient trade, or as an authority to a court of prize
to punish neutrals for the enjoyment of their liberties and
the exercise of their rights. Both descriptions, as is
the way with descriptions arguendo, beg the question.
Undoubtedly the right of retaliation exists. It is
described in the Zamo·ra 79 ; it is decided in the Stigstad, 80
as it had so often been decided by Sir William Scott over
a century ago. It would be disastrous for the neutral,
if this right were a mere executive right not subject to
revie'v in a prize court; it would be a denial of the belligerents' right, if it could be exercised only subject to a
paramount and absolute right of neutrals to be free to
carry on their trade with.out interference or inconvenience
scott ' s deci . This latter contention has already been negatived in the
sions.
Stigstad. 80 The argument in favor of the former, dra,vn
from the decisions of Sir William Scott, seems to their
lordships to be no less unacceptable. With the terms of
. orders in coun- the proclamations and orders in council from 1806 to
Cll, 1806-1812.
1812 their lordships are not now concerned. They were
such that the decisions on them in many cases involved
not merely the use of the term "blockade" but discussion
of, or at least allusion to, the nature of that right. It
is, however, in their opinion a mistake to argue, as has
been argued before them, that in those decisions the right
to condemn was deemed to arise from the fact that the
cases were cases of blockade., although the occasion for
the blockade 'vas the passing of a retaliatory order. In
their opinion Sir William Scott's doctrine consistently
was that retaliation is a branch of the rights whiyh the
711
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law of nations recognizes as belonging to belligerents, and
that it is as much enforceable by courts of prize as is the
the right of blockade. They find no warrant or authority
for holding that it is only enforceable by them when it
chances to be exercised under the form or the conditions
of a valid blockade. When once it is established that the
conduct of the enemy gave occasion for the exercise of
the right of retaliation, t.he real question is 'vhether the
n1ode in which it has been exercised is such as to be
invalid by reason of the burden 'vhich it in1poses on
neutrals, a question preeminently one of fact and of
degree.
The onslaught upon shipping generally 'vhich the
German Government announced and carried out at the
beginning of 1917 is now matter of history. Proof of its
formidable character, if proof 'vere needed, is to be found
in a comparison between the retaliation orders in council
of 1915 and of 1917, and their lordships take the recitals
of the latter order as. sufficiently establishing the necessity for further invoking the right of retaliation. They
address themselves accordingly to what is the real
question in the present appeal, namely, the character
and the de()'ree
of the danger and inconvenience to conDan~er
and
b
vemence
which the trade of neutrals was in fnct subjected by the neutral trade.
enforcement of that order. They do not think it necessary to criticize theoretic applications of the language of
the order to distant seas, where the enemy had neither •
trade nor shipping, a criterion which was argued for but
which they deem inapplicable. Nor have they been
unmindful of the fact that, to some extent, a retaliatory
order visits on neutrals the consequences of others'
wrongdoing, always disputed, though in the present case
hardly disputable, and that the other belligerent, in his
turn and also under the name of retaliation, may impose
upon them fresh restrictions; but it seems to them that
these disadvantages are inherent in the nature of this
established right, are unavoidable under a system ,,,.hich
is a historic growth and not a theoretic model of perfection,
and are relevant in truth only to the question of degree.
Accordingly they have taken the facts as they affected
the trade in which the Leonora was engaged, and they
have sincerely endeavored, as far as in them lay, to view
these facts as they would have appeared to fair-minded
and reasonable neutrals and to dismiss the righteous
indignation which might well become those 'vho recall
only the crisis of a desperate and terrible struggle.

in·
to
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Compliance with the requirements of the order in council would have involved the Leonora in difficulties, partly
of a commercial and partly of a military character. Her
voyage, and with it the ordinary expenses of her voyage,
would have been enlarged, and the loss of time and possibly the length of the voyage might have been added to
by the fact that no port or class of ports of call had been
appointed for the purpose of the order. Inconvenience
of this character seems to be inevitable under the circumstances. In so far as it is measurable entirely in
terms of money, the extra expense is such as could be
passed on to the parties liable to pay freight, and neither
by itself nor in connection with other and more serioua
matters should this kind of inconvenience be rated high.
It is important to observe that the order does not forbid the carriage of the goods in question altogether. The
neutral vessel may carry them at her peril, and that peril,
so far as condemnation is concerned, may be averted if
she calls at an appointed port.. The shipowner, no doubt,
would say that if his ship is to make the call he will never
be able to ship the cargo, for its chance of escape would
be but small, and that if he is to get the cargo he must risk
his ship and undertake to proceed direct to her destination. The contention is less formidable than it appears
to be on the surface. Their lordships know well, and the
late president with his experience kne\v incomparably
better, with what ingenuity and artifice the origin of a
cargo and every other damaging circumstance about it
have been disguised and concealed where the prize of success was high and the parties concerned were unfettered
by scruples and inspired by no disinterested motives.
They think that. the chance of escape in a British port of
call must be measured against the enormous economic
advantage to the enemy of carrying on this export trade
for the support of his foreign exchange and the benefit of
his much-needed imports, and they are convinced that
the chance might well be sufficient to induce the promoters of the trade both to pay, and indeed to prepay,
whatever freight the shipowner might require in order to
cover extra insurance and the costs of a protracted voyage, and to give to the actual shipper such favorable
terms of purchase, insurance, or otherwise, as would lead
him to expose his cargo to the risk of detection of its origin. They are far from thinking that compliance with
the order would exclude neutrals from all the advantage
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of the trade. If the voyages were fewer in number, they
would tend to be more profitable singly, and in any case
this particular traffic is but a very small part of the employment open, and legitimately so, to neutral traders,
and the risk of its loss need not be regarded as of great
moment.
There is also some evidence ' though it is not very clear 'palla.w.
Dutch munidthat Dutch municipal law forbade, under heavy penalties, that such a deviation as would be required by a call
at a British port should be made by a Dutch ship which
had cleared for Sweden. If, however, the order in council is in other respects valid, their lordships fail to see ho'v
the rights of His Majesty under it can be diminished or
the authority of an international court can be curtailed
by local rules, whicli forbid particular nationals to comply 'vith the order. If the neutral is inconvenienced by
such a conflict of duty, the cause lies in the prescriptions
of his own country's la,v, and does not involve any invalidity in the order.
retaliation
F ur ther, 1t IS pointe d out t h at, With the excep to1011 of byNoother
allied
France, the other allied powers did not find it necessary powers.
to resort to a similar act of retaliation, and it is contended
that, upon a comparison with the order of 1915 also, the
consequences involved in a disregard of the order of 1g 17
were of unnecessary severity and were unjustifiable
The first point appears to be covered by the rule that. on
a question of policy-and the question whether the tin1e
and occasion have arisen for resort to a further exercise
of the right of retaliation is essentially a question of policy-a court of prize ought to accept as sufficient proof
the public declarations of the responsible executive, but
in any case the special n1aritime position of His Majesty
in relation to that of his allies affords abundant ground for
refusing to regard a different course pursued by those
allies as a. reason for invalidating the order of 1917 . I f
the second point involves, as it seems to imply, the contentiod that a belligerent must retaliate on his enemy, so
far as neutrals are concerned, only on the t erms of compensating them for inconvenience, if any is sust ained, and
of rriaking it \Vorth their \Vhile to comply \Vith an order
which they do not find to be advantageous to their particular interests, it is inconsistent with the \vhole theory
on \Vhich the right of retaliation is exercised. The right
of retaliation is a right of the belligerent, not a concession
by the neutral. It is enjoyed by la'v and not on suffer0
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ance; and doubly so when, as in the present case, the
outrageous conduct of the enemy might have been treated
ns acts of \Var by all mankind.
Accordingly the most mat~rial question in this case is
the degree of risk to which the devin.tion required would
subject a neutral vessel which sought to comply with the
order. It is said, and with truth, that the German plan
\vas by mine and by submarine to deny the North Sea. to
trade; that the danger, prospective and actual, which
that plan involved must be deemed to have been real and
great, or else the justification of the order itself w·ould
fail; and that the deviation, \vhich the Leonora n1ust
have undertaken, \vould have involved crossing and
recrossing the area of peril.
J?egree of retalTheir lordships recall and apply ' what was said
in the
ntwn.
·
Stigstad, that in estimating the burden of the retaliation
account must be taken of the gravity of the original
offense which provoked it, and that it is material to consider not only the burden which the neutral is called
upon to bear, but the peril from which, at the price of
that burden, it may be expected that beHigerent retaliation \viii deliver him. It may be-let us pray that it
may be so-that an order of this severity may never be
needed, and therefore may never be justified again, for
the right of retaliation is one to be sparingly exercised
and to be strictly reviewed. Still the facts must be
faced. Can there be a doubt that the original provocation here was as grave as any recorded in history; that
it menaced and outraged neutrals as well as belligerents;
and that neutrals had no escape from the peril, except
by the successful and stringent employment of unusual
measures, or by an inglorious assent to the enslavement
of their trade~ Their lordships have none.
On the evidence of attacks on vessels of all kinds and
flags, hospital ships not excepted, which this record
contains, it is plain that measures of retaliation and repression would be fully justified in the interest of the
common good, even at the cost of very considerable risk
and inconvenience to neutrals in particular cases. Such
a conclusion having been established, their lordships
think that the burden of proof shifts, and that it was for
the appellants to sho,v, if they desired, that the risk and
inconvenience were in fact excessive, for the matter
being one of degree it is not reasonable to require that
the Crown, having proved so much affirmatively, should
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further proceed to prove a negative and to show that the
risk and inconvenience in any particular class of cases
'vere not excessive. Much is made in the appellants'
evidence of the fact that calling at a British port "\Vould
have taken the Leonora across a German mine field, but
it is very noticeable that throughout the case the very
numerous instances of losses by German action are cases
of losses by the action of submarines and not by mines.
The appellants filed a series of affidavits, stating in identical terms that in proceeding to a British port of call
vessels would incur very great risk of attack by submarines, especially if unaccompanied by an armed
-escort. Of the possibility of obtaining an armed escort
or other similar protection they say nothing, apparently
because they never had any intention of complying "\Yith
the order in council, and therefore were not concerned to
ascertain how much danger or how little their compliance
would really involve. Proof of the amount of danger
involved in crossing the mine field in itself is singularly
lacking, but the fact is plain that after a voyage of no
-extraordinary character the Leonora did reach Har,vich
in safety.
Under these circumstances their lordships see no su:ffi·c ient reason why, on a question of fact, as this question
is, they should differ from the considered conclusion of
the president. He was satisfied that the order in council
did not involve greater hazard or prejudice to the neutral
trade in question than was commensurate with the
gravity of the enemy outrages and the common need for
their repression, and their lordships are not minded te
disturb his finding. The appeals accordingly fail. Their
lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that they
should be dismissed with costs.
THE "DUSSELDORF."
[PRIVY CouNCIL.]
ON APPEAL FROM THE PRIZE COURT, ENGLAND.
July 29, 1920.
[1920] A. C. 1034.

Appeal from that portion of a decree of the president
of the admiralty division (in prize), 81 dated May 12,
1919, which has disallowed a claim in respect of costs and
11
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Decision.

